Work

On maximal classes of utility functions for efficient one-to-one negotiation

Year: 2005
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: We investigate the properties of an abstract negotiation framework where agents autonomously negotiate over allocations of discrete resources. In \nthis framework, reaching an optimal allocation potentially requires very complex multilateral deals. \nTherefore, we are interested in identifying classes \nof utility functions such that any negotiation conducted by means of deals involving only a single resource at time is bound to converge to an optimal \nallocation whenever all agents model their preferences using these functions. We show that the class \nof modular utility functions is not only sufficient \nbut also maximal in this sense.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2269366511
FWCI: 2.752
Cites: 10
Cited by: 23
Related to: 10