Democratic Rollback and Contracting for War: Managing the Intent of Accountability with Technical Versus Adaptive Solutions
Year: 2011
Type: preprint
Abstract: This study examines the potential for democratic rollback when contracting for security, reconstruction, and development during wartime. The context for analysis is U.S. contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003-2010. The adoption of hybrid governance structures poses serious accountability challenges to the legitimate use of force traditionally reserved for government, as when outsourcing responsibilities to nongovernmental entities or individuals. This study evaluates the supply of institutions emerging to hold contractors accountable, including an overlooked accountability mechanism of interagency statutes. Interagency statutes are aimed at technical solutions for improving oversight of war contracting. Findings suggest that technical solutions have the potential to undermine the intent of accountability, as they do not consider what Heifetz (2003) theorizes as adaptive challenges,which are attuned to issues of policy alignment, procedural incentives, interagency dynamics and differences over how certain policy outputs are valued. However, when evaluating compliance problems,adaptive challenges can emerge, when a) credible venues of interactive dialogue are engaged, and when b) ongoing dialogue routines between the bureaucracy and elected officials keep the focus on adaptive work. In doing so, the intent of accountability can be reclaimed and sustained.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Author: Holly T. Goerdel
Institution: University of Kansas
Language: English
Topic: Military and Defense Studies
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2272382749