Year: 2014
Type: article
Abstract: ‘What is said’ by an utterance, from a traditional truth-conditional view of language, is the uttered sentence’s conventionally encoded semantic meaning, and is distinguished from ‘what is implicated’, such as metaphor, which is understood as a type of speech in which a speaker says one thing but means another. Contextualists challenge this view of metaphor by offering three reasons to maintain that metaphor is classified within ‘what is said’: first, metaphor involves loose use; second, metaphor is assertoric; and, third, metaphor is at the level of the primary interpretation rather than the secondary one. However, Elizabeth Camp argues against these reasons. The aim of this paper is to examine her arguments and show that they are unsuccessful.
Author: Hsiu-Lin Ku
Language: English
Subfield: Language and Linguistics
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2275106256