Apres moi le deluge: Individuals, incentives, and conflict termination
Year: 2010
Type: dissertation
Abstract: Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2010.; Includes bibliographical references.; Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format. This work analyzes the impact of a leader's personal security on the conflict termination process and asks three questions. First, why do some states surrender when they still have latent military capabilities? Second, why do some states continue fighting when they have little if any hope of achieving their war aims? Third, why do some states fail to act as rational-utility maximizers during the conflict-termination process? To answer these questions, this work begins by examining the predictions of existing systemic, domestic, and cultural models and then proposes and tests an alternative theory based on the personal security of individual leaders. This alternative theory claims that national leaders are particularly sensitive to their private security needs and, under certain circumstances, will alter their nations' war aims to protect their personal welfare. Building on this theory, this work proposes and tests six hypotheses for how personal security of national leaders may alter national war aims and conflict termination outcomes. To test these hypotheses, this work performs a qualitative analysis of five cases (Poland during The Russo-Polish War, France during WWII, Japan during WWII, Iraq during the Iran Iraq War, and Iraq during Gulf War I) and compares the actual behaviors of leaders with the theoretical predictions of the existing and alternative theories. After an analysis of these theoretical models, this work concludes with a series of policy recommendations and directions for further research.
Author: John Furman Daniel
Institution: Georgetown University
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2276058623
