Promiscuous Politicians and the Problem of Party Building: Local Politicians as Party Brokers
Year: 2014
Type: preprint
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: High levels of party switching by former candidates undermine the building of strong party organizations. These politicians retain means of attracting voters, and may function as political brokers to help other politicians get elected. However, they do not automatically support their own party, but may rather defect. I argue that all else equal, parties will compete, and former candidates will sell their bloc of votes to the highest bidder. I test this hypothesis in Brazil, where endemic switching has been a long-noted weakness of its parties. In 2007 the Supreme Court decided that winning candidates may not retain their offices if they change parties. Comparing regression discontinuities before and after the ruling, I identify an increase in the loyalty rate of winning mayoral candidates, and, further, I show that loyal brokerage pays off for the success of federal deputies running for elections.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Author: Lucas M. Novaes
Institution: University of California, Berkeley
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2281156354