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Bribery and voter control under voting-rule uncertainty

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Year: 2014
Type: article
Source: Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agents Systems
DOI: 10.5555/2615731.2615744
Authors: Gábor Erdélyi, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra
Institutions: University of Siegen, Rochester Institute of Technology, University of Rochester
Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: bribery, voting rules, computational social choice, manipulation, computational complexity, tie-breaking, approval voting
SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: closed
OpenAlex ID: W2288203584
FWCI: 2.788
Cites: 25
Cited by: 15
Related to: 10
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