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Bribery and voter control under voting-rule uncertainty
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Year:
2014
Type:
article
Source:
Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agents Systems
DOI:
10.5555/2615731.2615744
Authors:
Gábor Erdélyi,
Edith Hemaspaandra,
Lane A. Hemaspaandra
Institutions:
University of Siegen,
Rochester Institute of Technology,
University of Rochester
Language:
English
Topic:
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Subfield:
Economics and Econometrics
Field:
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain:
Social Sciences
Keywords:
bribery,
voting rules,
computational social choice,
manipulation,
computational complexity,
tie-breaking,
approval voting
show all 7
SDG:
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Open Access status:
closed
OpenAlex ID:
W2288203584
FWCI:
2.788
Cites:
25
Cited by:
15
Related to:
10