Year: 2014
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: Experimental psychology often relies on a distinction between top-down and bottom-up effects. This distinction is problematic because top-down effects are poorly defined. Specifically, top-down effects are defined as effects of previously stored information on processing of current input, which is far too broad since it includes dispositions to transition from some types of representational states to others, which are implicit in the operation of any psychological process. This chapter suggests a way to distinguish information stored in that way from the kind of influence of prior information that psychologists are concerned to classify as a top-down effect. The distinction drawn here illuminates discussions of the cognitive penetration of perception, as well as discussions of the theoretical usefulness of a perception-cognition distinction.
Source: Oxford University Press eBooks
Parent work: Perception and Its Modalities
Author: Nicholas Shea
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2288371103
