Stochastic nonzero-sum games: a new connection between singular control and optimal stopping
Year: 2018
Type: article
Abstract: In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and certain two-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is attained by hitting times at two separate boundaries, then such boundaries also trigger a Nash equilibrium in the game of singular control. Moreover, a differential link between the players' value functions holds across the two games.
Source: Advances in Applied Probability
DOI: 10.1017/apr.2018.17
Authors: Tiziano De Angelis, Giorgio Ferrari
Institutions: University of Leeds, Bielefeld University
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2289293732
