Practical Padding Oracle Attacks on RSA
Year: 2012
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: We revise attacks on the RSA cipher based on side-channels that leak partial information about the plaintext. We show how to compute a plaintext when only its parity is leaked. We then describe PKCS#1 v1.5 padding for RSA and we show that the simple leakage of padding errors is enough to recover the whole plaintext, even when it is unpadded or padded under another scheme. This vulnerability is well-known since 1998 but the flawed PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is still broadly in use. We discuss recent optimizations of this padding oracle attack that make it effective on commercially available cryptographic devices.
Author: Riccardo Focardi
Institution: Ca' Foscari University of Venice
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Keywords: side-channel attacks, attack optimization
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2290029932
