Year: 2014
Type: article
Abstract: In this paper I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern.I outline D. Parfit's theory, in which the concerns receive a metaphysical justification.Then, I focus on two objections: C. Korsgaard's claim that the concerns are justified by the unity of agency, and M. Johnston's contention that the concerns are prima facie justified independently of a metaphysical theory.I argue that even if these theories have a point, they do not cover a range of situations in which justification may be sought.It is in these situations that a metaphysical theory may find its place.
Author: Radim Bělohrad
Institution: Masaryk University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2297119917