Work

Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?

Year: 2016

Type: article

Abstract: For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism , it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for grounding epistemic normativity.

Source: Philosophical Studies

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-016-0657-8

Author: Charles Côté-Bouchard

Institution: King's College London

Language: English

Topic: Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,190

Funders: University of Edinburgh, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada