Work

Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia

Year: 2016

Type: article

Abstract: This paper shows that adding a small application cost to a transfer program can substantially improve targeting through self-selection. Our village-level experiment in Indonesia finds that requiring beneficiaries to apply for benefits results in substantially poorer beneficiaries than automatic enrollment using the same asset test. Marginally increasing application costs on an experimental basis does not further improve targeting. Estimating a model of the application decision implies that the results are largely driven by the nonpoor, who make up the bulk of the population, forecasting that they are unlikely to pass the asset test and therefore not bothering to apply.

Source: Journal of Political Economy

DOI: 10.1086/685299

Authors: Vivi Alatas, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken, Ririn Purnamasari, Matthew Wai-Poi

Institutions: World Bank, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University

Language: English

Topic: Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: No poverty, Reduced inequalities

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2297629598