Year: 2016
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: By virtue of Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë’s enactive sensorimotor contingency theory, and its central tenets- perception is constituted by mastery of occurrent sensorimotor contingencies used for thought and action-guidance- the theory suggests the resolution of the explanatory gap problem and provides arguments to dismantle representationalist research programs. Central objections to O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory are addressed: (1) synaesthetic visual color-perception and the problem of non-identical ratios of qualitative experience from peripheral inputs (2) sensorimotor contingency theory implies propositional knowledge- consequently perceptual consciousness is state-based. Temporal coupling shows synaesthesia does not have to be constituted by isomorphic input-output mappings for perceptual consciousness. Objection (2), for radical enactivism lacks epistemological implications for both enactive cognition and future research in perceptual consciousness. Epistemological implications of the sensorimotor contingency theory are addressed through Varela, et al.’s embodied cognition and mindfulness theory which demonstrates pragmatic value for a sensorimotor contingency theory.
Author: Celine Geday
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2298909761