Year: 1988
Type: article
Abstract: Among classical liberal political philosophers with a commitment to basic human rights, Hobbes's position is probably the most anomalous and contentious. Admittedly, Hobbes affirms some of the customary tenents concerning these rights. For example, possessing a unique nature-being human-suffices for the ascription of basic rights to persons. Hobbes's of belongs to persons independent of any specific (say contractual) relationships they may bear to others either within or without the confines (legal or otherwise) of a particular government or society.' Further, Hobbes's right of nature is an inalienable right in the sense in which no person can be obligated to act or be subjected to actions threatening his own well-being even if that person has agreed to social arrangements which might demand the contrary. And finally, these rights are of such high moral rank that their possession morally entitles persons to act contrary to at least some powers which governments routinely exercise. In fact, Hobbes's basic right of nature can be interpreted as establishing the limits of an individual's obligations to even a legitimately constituted authority. But this much is standard fare for most liberals, and Hobbes's position on basic rights is special because of commitments other than these.
Source: Noûs
DOI: 10.2307/2215457
Author: George E. Panichas
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2317529567