Year: 2015
Type: article
Abstract: I here critique the application of the traditional, similarity-based account of natural kinds to debates in psychology. A challenge to such accounts of kindhood—familiar from the study of biological species—is a metaphysical phenomenon that I call ‘transitional gradation’: the systematic progression of slightly modified transitional forms between related candidate kinds. Where such gradation proliferates, it renders the selection of similarity criteria for kinds arbitrary. Reflection on general features of learning—especially on the gradual revision of concepts throughout the acquisition of expertise—shows that even the strongest candidates for similarity-based kinds in psychology exhibit systematic transitional gradation. As a result, philosophers of psychology should abandon discussion of kindhood, or explore non-similarity based accounts. 1. Introduction: The Similarity Thesis 2. Transitional Gradation 3. Transitional Gradation in Psychology: Prototypes and Ideal Models 4. The Explanatory Import of Transitional Gradation in Psychology: Ontogeny and Expertise4.1. The importance of ontogeny 4.2. Mechanisms underlying expert concepts (in humans) 4.3. Mechanisms underlying animal concepts 5. Conclusion
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv020
Author: Cameron Buckner
Institution: University of Houston
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung
OpenAlex ID: W2321451263