OpenAlex
PricingAboutJobs
Log inGet started
Work

The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information

HTML

Year: 1992
Type: article
Source: American Journal of Political Science
DOI: 10.2307/2111488
Authors: Jeffrey S. Banks, Barry R. Weingast
Institutions: Hoover Institution, University of Rochester, The University of Texas at Austin, Stanford University
Language: English

Topic: Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Field: Business, Management and Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: interest group influence, bureaucratic politics, information asymmetry, regulatory agencies, agency design, political control of bureaucracy, regulatory performance, information advantage
SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: closed

Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W2328001391
FWCI: 15.31
Cites: 27
Cited by: 310
Related to: 9
OpenAlex
Nonprofit
Open DataOpen Data
Open Source
Product
Search
Compare
Pricing
Repositories
Unpaywall
Unsub
Developers
API docs
Data snapshot
Status
Source code
Organization
About
Team
Testimonials
Brand
Jobs
Community
Help center
Contact
Events
Blog
Mailing list
Supporters
Legal
Privacy
Accessibility
Terms