Work

Game Theoretic Analysis of Physical Protection System Design.

Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: We have modeled the physical protection system (PPS) of a fictional small modular reactor (SMR) facility as a platform for a game theoretic approach to security decision analysis.The PPS modeled is based on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory (NRC) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements for security of nuclear facilities.The framework of the PPS consists of various classes of security measures placed systematically throughout the facility to provide defense in depth and a graded security approach.To demonstrate the game theoretic approach, we model a rational adversary with inside information attempting to sabotage the facility.The adversary adjusts his decisions in response to investments made by the defender to enhance the security measures.The most advantageous pathway for the adversary maximizes the product of consequence to the facility and the probability of the adversary succeeding in his attack.The defender implements security upgrades in locations that best defend the facility against the adversary, while being constrained by a budget.The results allow cost benefit analysis while conservatively modeling the defense against an all-knowing adversary.This paper describes the design of the PPS, specifically a systematic approach to assembling the physical protection system (and potential upgrades to it).One unique result of the game theoretic analysis of the physical protection system is an "efficient frontier" that depicts the return on investment of each set of security upgrades as a function of budget. .
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2402080301
FWCI:
Cites: 5
Cited by: 2
Related to: 10