Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance
Year: 2005
Type: article
Abstract: This is particularly striking in light of the fact that corporate governance scholarship, at least since the time of Berle and Means, has focused on the board as the corporate constituent best situated to manage or monitor the corporation's affairs and overcome the intrinsic conflict of interest that arises when corporate managers have access to the shareholders' money.That scholarship, as well as a variety of reform efforts and a substantial amount of case law, has viewed board structure as the solution to what has become known, for the last thirty years, as the "agency problem" in corporate governance.4 Drawing on economic sociology, I argue that corporate law reform efforts have focused on the wrong actors: while the law's principal interest is board governance, it should instead focus on the CEO and how the relationship between internal corporate structures and board structures provide opportunities for misconduct.5 While the CEO is important to the initial inquiry, the real problem goes even deeper; the focus of corporate law should be on the CEO and the entire senior Bartmann for mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and money laundering.Fallen Firm's CEO Faces Fraud Claims in Federal Indictment, CHI TRIB., Dec. 13, 2002, at D3.I NFORMIX: In November, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California obtained the indictment of former Informix CEO Phillip White on charges of securities, mail and wire fraud in connection with financial accounting fraud at the database software company.Matt Richtel, Finding
Source: Brooklyn law review
Author: Lawrence E. Mitchell
Institution: Brooklyn Law School
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2423795394
