Year: 2011
Type: article
Abstract: O ne of the largest security concerns facing the United States today is how to mitigate its vulnerability to cyberweapons.Over the past twenty years, cyberthreats have evolved from solitary hackers motivated by monetary gain and prestige to organized crime and state actors.The sophistication and capabilities of these threats grows in direct proportion to the level of connectivity in society.Despite this steady development of cyberthreats, relatively little attention is given to discerning how these threats will impact warfighting and the international system.Most of the current literature on cyberwarfare considers it, at best, a force multiplier.Many scholars disregard its effects as a standalone attack vector, citing various reasons from US responses to Pearl Harbor and 9/11 to the inability of strategic bombing in World War II to subdue the civilian populations in England and Germany, absent combined military operations.These perspectives are correct in arguing that offensive cyberoperations without traditional, conventional power will be largely futile.This analytical approach, however, presumes that cyberweapons will be used in an offensive, first-strike manner.The long-range strike capabilities of cyberwar have the potential to be extremely effective when employed as an anticoercion weapon.In essence, a strong cyber capability is a deterrent force that will largely mitigate outside interference in domestic and regional affairs.Because there are no confirmed cases of a large-scale, state-sanctioned cyberattack, analysts are currently forced to explore different weapon systems and theories to help both the fighter and the politician understand how cyberweapons can be utilized and what vulnerabilities this new class of weapon creates.Given the unique characteristics of cyberspace and cyberweapons, no existing technology or theory will provide an adequate understanding.Nevertheless, by borrowing tenets from both strategic airpower theory and early debates on nuclear weapons doctrine and deterrence, the approximate capabilities of cyberweapons become far less opaque.
Author: Ross M. Rustici
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W243501403