Big Men with Big Friends: Explaining Political Stability in Africa
Year: 2013
Type: preprint
Abstract: Why have some African executives successfully consolidated their authority while others have been threatened by coup d’etat and political violence? The author argues that new leaders who co-opt elites from the previous regime into the ruling coalition are more successful in deterring threats to consolidation than those who drastically change the political landscape. Using cabinet ministers as a proxy, I track ruling coalition membership during executive transitions in 20 African countries. This approach follows existing research on ruling coalitions and extraconstitutional regime change but makes one important departure. Instead of looking at the size of ruling coalitions, this research is interested in who is part of the ruling coalition. A proportional hazards model of leadership survival is used to show that who is part of the ruling coalition is more important than the size of the ruling coalition.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Author: Alex M. Kroeger
Institution: University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2466301559
