Year: 2016
Type: article
Abstract: In recent years, there has been a great effort to prove the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a minimum number of assumptions. Besides its intrinsic theoretical interest, this would allow for larger tolerance against device imperfections in the actual implementations. However, even in this device-independent scenario, one assumption seems unavoidable, that is, the presence of a protected space devoid of any unwanted information leakage in which the legitimate parties can privately generate, process and store their classical data. In this paper we relax this unrealistic and hardly feasible assumption and introduce a general formalism to tackle the information leakage problem in most of existing QKD systems. More specifically, we prove the security of optical QKD systems using phase and intensity modulators in their transmitters, which leak the setting information in an arbitrary manner. We apply our security proof to cases of practical interest and show key rates similar to those obtained in a perfectly shielded environment. Our work constitutes a fundamental step forward in guaranteeing implementation security of quantum communication systems.
Source: New Journal of Physics
Authors: Kiyoshi Tamaki, Marcos Curty, Marco Lucamarini
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,610
Funders: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Atlantic Research Center for Information and Communication Technologies, Council for Science, Technology and Innovation, European Regional Development Fund, European Metrology Programme for Innovation and Research
Awards: G2321109776, G4731843909, G898007259
OpenAlex ID: W2472597165