Year: 2015
Type: dissertation
Abstract: The thesis develops Gendlin's concept of the felt sense in two directions, and \nintroduces parallel concepts of self. It starts by examining western and eastern \ncultural contexts, neuroscientific conceptualisations and linguistic issues as \nthey relate to self, using the lens of Gendlin's two ways of relating to the world \n̶ interpreting according to the unit model and thinking beyond patterns, to \npoint out conceptual confusions. Buddhist philosophy and practice are \ndiscussed as methods of undoing such conceptual confusions in order to \nrelieve suffering, with self as an independent, stable, substantial entity being \nthe primary example of such a confusion. Dualism is identified as the basic \nmisconception from which suffering ensues. Non-duality is investigated as a \nspiritual endstate, an integral part of the goals of humanistic therapies and an \nintrinsic element in 'carrying forward', then compared with Gendlin's implicit \nintricacy, Sartre's Being-in-itself and intersubjective theories. A small \nqualitative study investigates what happens when felt senses of self are \nintentionally produced or accessed by focusing. A continuum of experiences is \ndescribed, ranging from self to no-self, with trauma proving a major block to \nboth self and no-self experiencings. The felt sense is re-defined in two ways, as \nan extending boundary and as a direct referent. A sense of self is also \nconsidered both as a boundary drawing exercise, and a direct referent. Self \nmay function in either of these forms on a relative level, constructively or \ndestructively, according to circumstances and conditions, while on an \nontological level no such single entity may be proven to exist. The conclusion \nis drawn that self and no-self form a kind of twisting human thread, which \nshows, at any one moment, just one side of a duality. These sides are \nconceptually, rather than actually, distinct.
Author: Sarah Luczaj
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2477297186