Year: 2006
Type: article
Abstract: "This article presents an interpretation of Aristotelian phrónêsis and its \nrelevance for action research. After pointing out some insufficiencies in \nhow phrónêsis is applied by other interpreters with relevance for action \nresearch, I present my own interpretation of Aristotle’s concept in the \nwider context of his thinking on intellectual and ethical virtues. The \narticle’s conclusion is that phrónêsis is very important for both action \nresearchers and others. But at the same time, phrónêsis is not a concept \nthat can be adopted by itself, alone, and in isolation from other intellectual \nand ethical virtues or ways of knowing. Phrónêsis is necessary, but at the \nsame time insufficient. Phrónêsis is not a concept primarily concerned \nwith learning, inquiry, and research. Its primary focus is “application”, \nperformance, or enactment. Action research has a lot to learn from \nAristotle, and phrónêsis is definitely among the things to be learned. \nAristotle’s praxis-orientation sticks even deeper, however. This more \nprofound praxis-orientation becomes quite invisible by operating with \nsimplified and mutually exclusive divisions between phrónêsis, tékhnê, \nand epistêmê, and by conflating other distinctions that were important to \nmaintain for Aristotle. Aristotle’s profound praxis-orientation is even \nmore central to action research. It has to do with dialogue or dialectics \nwhose tasks really are fundamentally concerned with learning, inquiry, \nand research." (author's abstract)
Author: Olav Eikeland
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W247735651