Social mechanisms and explaining how : A reply to Kimberly Chuang
Year: 2012
Type: article
Abstract: Kimberly Chuang’s detailed and helpful reply to my article (2012a) concerns Jon Elster’s struggle to develop a mechanistic account that sheds light on explanation in social science. I argue that a problem exists with Elster’s current conception of mechanistic explanation in social contexts. Chuang (2012) defends Elster’s conception against my critique. I still believe I have identified a problem with Elster’s conception. In this reply I want to recapitulate briefly Elster’s idea, as I understand it, and then use some of Chuang’s critical points to advance the position I advocate. 1. Social explanations and Elster’s mechanistic surrogate for covering law explanations Elster roots his perspective in a traditional view of explanation. A traditional view holds that a perfect covering law explanation is the best kind of explanation. Elster also assumes that all explanation is causal (Elster 2007, 7) and that the basic type of thing to be explained (the explanandum) is an event (9). In other words, the ideal explanation is when we can account for an event by citing the relevant causal law that produced it. The problem, as Elster sees it, is that we know of few such explanations in the social
Author: Johannes Persson
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2485488650