Security Analysis of Scantegrity, an Electronic Voting System
Year: 2016
Type: article
Abstract: Electronic voting machines are becoming an increasingly popular alternative to paper ballots. With this increase in use we must analyze how well these machines adhere to voting requirements, including those relating to security, privacy, and anonymity. This paper includes analysis of the security and auditing mechanisms of the open-source electronic voting system Scantegrity. We focus on Scantegrity, not to single it out as a vulnerable system, but because it is a popular system that has actually been used in practice. It may contain design flaws and vulnerabilities that might exist in other systems of similar designs, current or future. Therefore, it is our hope that the vulnerabilities that we bring to light will be considered by current and future designers of electronic voting systems, and that the solutions that we propose will also be considered as possible remediations.
Authors: Jonathan Ganz, Matt Bishop, Sean Peisert
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: National Science Foundation
Awards: III-CXT: Process Families and Their Application to Online Dispute Resolution, CT-M: Computer System Vulnerabilities and the Efficacy of Defensive Mechanisms, TC:Medium:Collaborative Research: Technological Support for Improving Election Processes, Auditing Voting Systems While Preserving Secrecy and Anonymity, Collaborative Research: Process-Centered, Analysis-driven System Development Applied to Human-Intensive Medical Processes
OpenAlex ID: W2510851679
