Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: According to perdurantism, objects persist by being spread out over time just as composite three-dimensional objects are spread out over space. Just as a composite threedimensional object is spread out over space by having spatial parts, objects persist, according to perdurantism, by having temporal parts. Perdurantism can be stated more precisely by saying what exactly a temporal part is. In the sequel, Theodore Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part ’ shall be assumed: x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t =df. (1) x exists at, but only at, t; (2) x is part of y at t; and (3) x overlaps at t everything that is part of y at t. (2001: 59) Much more could be and has been said about how perdurantism should be formulated. 1 Though interesting in their own right, nothing of importance here turns on these matters of formulation. In ‘Problems of Identity ’ (1971), Roderick Chisholm argued that reflection on phenomenal experience reveals that persons do not have temporal parts. Chisholm’s Phenomenal Argument, hereafter simply ‘the Phenomenal Argument’, has received much
Author: Donald Smith
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2519501166