Year: 1994
Type: article
Abstract: In # 476 of his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein says:We should distinguish between the object of fear and the cause of fear.Thus a face which inspires fear or delight (the object of fear or delight), is not on that account its cause, but -one might say -its target.Wittgensteinthus sees fear as intentional, i.e., it is of an object.In# 473 of the same work he says:The belief that fire will burn me is of the same kind as the fear that it will burn me.In this case too, we can see that Wittgenstein deals with fear as an intentional state.He equates it with belief, which is a paradigm case of an intentional state.In his example, the belief and the fear share content.This content (that fire will burn the subject), referring to a state of affairs in the world, external to the• subject's mind, is what makes these belief and fear intentional states, and is what makes them the intentional states that they are.Thus, according to Wittgenstein, fear is intentional in the same way as belief is intentional.That is, none is parasitic upon the other for its intentionality.This is the point in asserting them to belong to the same kind while emphasizing their equal intentional content.Searle also sees fear as intentional.A conscious fear of snakes is one
Source: Philosophica
Author: Amir HOROWITZ
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2521209199