Bridging the Constitutional Gap in EU Executive Rule-Making: The Court of Justice Approves Legislative Conferral of Intervention Powers to European Securities Markets Authority - C-270/12, UK v Parliament and Council
Year: 2014
Type: preprint
Abstract: The case note analyses the judgement of 22 January 2014 of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Case C-270/12 UK v. Parliament and Council (Short selling). In the case the Court bridged the gap between Union primary law, remaining silent on Union agencies' decision-making powers, and a growing body of secondary law expressly creating them. The step taken by the Court is arguably brave: with the help of the enhanced judicial review mechanisms of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court was able to presume the existence of a constitutional mandate to delegate binding executive powers to an EU agency. The ruling eases the constitutional tensions overshadowing the on-going reorganisation and vertical consolidation of financial supervisory powers in the EU. However, the decision also makes other constitutional problems more salient, notably the inconsistent procedural safeguards against EU executive rule-making that takes place outside the hierarchy of norms set up by the Treaty of Lisbon. For that reason, too, the Meroni doctrine, now for the first time applied to agencies, will serve an important function.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Author: Heikki Marjosola
Institution: University of Helsinki
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2528531262
