Year: 2016
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Kernel hardening has been an important topic since many applications and security mechanisms often consider the kernel as part of their Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Among various hardening techniques, Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR) is the most effective and widely adopted defense mechanism that can practically mitigate various memory corruption vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflow and use-after-free. In principle, KASLR is secure as long as no memory leak vulnerability exists and high entropy is ensured.
Authors: Yeongjin Jang, Sangho Lee, Taesoo Kim
Institution: Georgia Institute of Technology
Language: English
Subfield: Hardware and Architecture
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
Awards: SaTC-EDU: EAGER: Big Data and Security: Educating the Next-Generation Security Analysts, G1761741488, G3337934819, G3371991119, CI-P: Collaborative: Planning for a Community-Driven Open Research Infrastructure to Support Secure Computing Research involving Intel SGX, G5022095762, G5583559361, G6486092784, TWC: Medium: Collaborative: Systems, Tools, and Techniques for Executing, Managing, and Securing SGX Programs
OpenAlex ID: W2529582363