Work

Essays in international conflict

Year: 2015
Type: dissertation
Abstract: In the first chapter of my dissertation, I outline and analyze a competitive framework of international relations wherein states are envisioned as consumers in a contentious marketplace over a set of commodities. Two kinds of competition occur simultaneously: economic competition through exchange and military competition through costly expropriation. To study behavior, I introduce the dual-competitive equilibrium: a set of market-clearing prices given war's opportunity costs and a set of best-response military deployments. These prices determine the value of the costs of war and the value of the benefits of expropriation, which in turn determine when war is profitable. I prove the existence and generic finiteness of the dual-competition equilibrium under a general set of conditions. Importantly, the dual-competitive equilibrium derives the bargaining model's key assumption (that destructive war is inefficient) but does not retain the welfare properties of textbook general equilibrium models. In an application, I use the competitive model to demonstrate that trade does not necessarily bring about peace and, perhaps more importantly, not all efficient outcomes can be achieved absent political intervention. In the second chapter of the dissertation, I use a simpler version of the competitive framework to assess when third parties can bring about peace among potential belligerents by letting trade pacify. Scholars posit many ways by which third parties can pacify would-be belligerents. Peacemakers might resolve informational problems through mediation, or they might monitor compliance with peace agreements, or they may provide a security guarantee, and so on. In this paper, I argue for another method: third parties can adjust disputants' relative wealth and power and, what's more, they can do so in a way that trade, rather than heavy handed intervention, performs part of the job. To formalize the mechanism, I develop and analyze a general equilibrium model of intervention, trade, and war. Due to a particular set of assumptions made to generate an ideal hard case, two states---characterized by relative endowments of two commodities and by the probability that one wins a war over the other---find themselves at a seemingly hopeless impasse: peace only obtains for a single bundle in the consumption space. A third party attempts to bring about peace by adjusting the states' endowments of commodities and the war lottery probability, but these adjustments are costly. After the intervention, the states make a trade and determine whether to fight for the right to consume all of both commodities. While peace is infinitely improbable, it is supportable as a Walrasian equilibrium if the third party chooses the appropriate intervention, which has several interesting properties. Finally, in the third chapter of the dissertation, I turn my attention to the onset of civil conflict and ask whether expectations about third party intervention affect would-be rebels' decisions. I argue that rebel groups contemplating their decision to start a civil war look ahead to potential third party interveners. If they feel that many strong states will intervene on their behalf, then they should be more likely to rebel; likewise, if strong states are likely to intervene on the side of the government, then the rebels should be deterred. To assess the claim, I propose a novel statistical model (η-player statistical backward induction) of civil war onset and third party intervention. Rebels make their violent decisions knowing that any other state in the system might intervene and that each potential intervention is either rebel- or government-biased. The rebels derive different utilities from different would-be interveners. My substantive results suggest that rebels feel empowered by the prospect of rebel-biased intervention, but not if those interventions are from major powers. The result is persistent across a number of interesting substantive tests. The model significantly improves upon existing country-year models, indicating that the shadow of intervention, counterintuitive as it may be, looms large.</
Authors: Carroll, Robert J., Signorino, Curtis S.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2537616018
Cites: 137
Cited by:
Related to: 10