Work

Ontology and Reason Giving in Law

Year: 2016
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: John Gardner has noted that legal positivism is more a theory of legal validity than \nit is a theory about law ’ s nature. 1 This is true in that one can be a legal positivist \nand hold a variety of different theories about law ’ s nature, but not to the extent \nthat ‘ anything goes ’ ontologically speaking. Rather, it seems fairly diffi cult to be a \nlegal positivist and not say that the law is a kind of social fact. \nThat being said, however, there are a variety of ways of creating social facts so \nthere is some room for disagreement when it comes to the nature of law within \nthe wide umbrella of legal positivism. If our focus is legal validity, then we may not \nhave too much reason to wade into these deeper metaphysical waters. However, \nI believe that legal positivism has a challenge that is not (as) present in other \ntheories of law: the problem of explaining law ’ s normativity. I contend that one \nof the best hopes for meeting this challenge is to be found in getting more clarity \nabout what it is that yields these special social facts, although I remain open to the \npossibility that the challenge can also be met in other ways. \nLet us fi rst get a bit more clarity on the challenge itself, then we will see how \nsettling the metaphysical questions about law can help to meet the challenge, and \nthen I can suggest how my preferred answer to the metaphysical questions meets \nthe challenge...
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4213053129
FWCI:
Cites:
Cited by: 2
Related to: 10