Information Asymmetries in the Hiring Process and the Risk of New Leader Dismissal: Insights from English Premier League Soccer Organizations
Year: 2017
Type: article
Abstract: Why are some new leaders dismissed more quickly than others? Adopting agency theory logic, the authors examine how different succession contexts shape boards’ information asymmetries about a potential candidate's competencies in the hiring process, which influences the propensity of making poor hiring decisions and hence the risk of new leader dismissal. Employing duration analysis on a sample of 164 newly appointed leaders in the English premier league (1996–2014), the authors find that the risk of new leader dismissal is: (i) greater when the predecessor leader's exit was initiated by them rather than by the board; (ii) greater when following a longer‐tenured predecessor; and (iii) lower for outside successions compared with inside successions.
Source: British Journal of Management
Authors: Malay N. Desai, Andy Lockett, David Paton
Institutions: University of Nottingham, University of Warwick
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2549070833