Work

E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India

Year: 2016

Type: report

Abstract: In collaboration with the Government of Bihar, India, we conducted a large-scale experiment to evaluate whether transparency in fiscal transfer systems can increase accountability and reduce corruption in the implementation of a workfare program.The reforms introduced electronic fundflow, cut out administrative tiers, and switched the basis of transfer amounts from forecasts to documented expenditures.Treatment reduced leakages along three measures: expenditures and hours claimed dropped while an independent household survey found no impact on actual employment and wages received; a matching exercise reveals a reduction in fake households on payrolls; and local program officials' self-reported median personal assets fell.

Source: National Bureau of Economic Research

DOI: 10.3386/w22803

Authors: Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Clement Imbert, Santhosh Mathew, Rohini Pande

Institutions: National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University, Government of India, University of Warwick, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Language: English

Topic: Local Government Finance and Decentralization

Subfield: Political Science and International Relations

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Peace, justice, and strong institutions, No poverty

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2550128708

Cites: 36

Cited by: 102

Related to: 10