Year: 2015
Type: dissertation
Abstract: Is there a condition that we recognize in other animals that we must uphold as having absolute value, and that can limit our conduct as a matter of moral imperative? Animals are excluded from direct concern in Kant’s moral philosophy because they do not share in the condition that grounds the moral imperative, namely, the capacity to determine one’s own ends through reason. The reason we value our capacity for free election, however, is because it is the means by which we, as free beings, become unified with our own end. The condition of absolute worth that we must uphold, therefore, is in the unity of our purpose in our being. Animals, as an end of nature, are unified with their own end in their original condition and, therefore, share in the condition that all rational beings must uphold as an absolute value and an end in itself.
Source: TSpace (University of Toronto)
Author: Michelle Man Ha Tse
Institution: University of Toronto
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2563206365
