Work

The Political Economy of Weak Treaties

Year: 2019

Type: article

Abstract: In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelection. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are “weak,” in that they may or may not be complied with: this makes it possible to differentiate the alternative candidates in a way that favors the incumbent. We also show that political economy considerations lead to overambitious treaties that rely too much on technology instead of sanctions to motivate compliance. Our theory can rationalize several puzzles associated with treaties.

Source: Journal of Political Economy

DOI: 10.1086/704610

Authors: Marco Battaglini, Bård Harstad

Institutions: Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance, Cornell University, University of Oslo, Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research

Language: English

Topic: International Relations and Foreign Policy

Subfield: Political Science and International Relations

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2565225599

FWCI: 20.69

Cites: 46

Cited by: 54

Related to: 10