Unconditional security of key distribution from causality constraints
Year: 2006
Type: preprint
Abstract: The CHSH-protocol generates secret key from correlations that violate the CHSH-inequality sufficiently much. In this paper, a security proof against general attacks is provided for this protocol. The only assumption made in the proof is that the information accessible to any eavesdropper must be compatible with the impossibility of signalling. This results provide a secure key distribution scheme in situations where the honest parties distrust their apparatuses. The techniques developed for the proof are fairly generic, so that also other entanglement-based protocols can be proved secure by modifying the details. We also analyze a variant of the CHSH-protocol, which yields higher key rates.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Lluís Masanes, Andreas Winter
Language: English
Subfield: Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics
Field: Physics and Astronomy
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W25685292
