Work

Asymptotic optimality of myopic optimization in trial-offer markets with social influence

Year: 2016

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: We study dynamic trial-offer markets, in which participants first try a product and later decide whether to purchase it or not. In these markets, social influence and position biases have a greater effect on the decisions taken in the sampling stage than those in the buying stage. We consider a myopic policy that maximizes the market efficiency for each incoming participant, taking into account the inherent quality of products, position biases, and social influence. We prove that this myopic policy is optimal and predictable asymptotically.

Source: Minerva Access (University of Melbourne)

Authors: Andrés Abeliuk, Gerardo Berbeglia, Felipe Maldonado, Pascal Van Hentenryck

Institutions: The University of Melbourne, Data61, Australian National University, University of Michigan

Language: English

Topic: Supply Chain and Inventory Management

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funder: Australian Government

OpenAlex ID: W2574575664

FWCI: 2.481

Cites: 19

Cited by: 4

Related to: 10