Distributive justice, political legitimacy, and independent financial insitutions
Year: 2016
Type: dissertation
Abstract: In the present dissertation I present a broad instrumental account of the legitimacy of independent central banks. I claim that if the right institutional design is chosen, and it protects democratic participation in several ways and promotes sorne basic distributional goals of the government, the institution of central bank independence might be legitimate, and thus the government might not weaken its own right to rule, or moral authority to crea te enforceable political obligations, when it delegates control over monetary policy to an independent agency. I also offer a sufficientarian account of the central bank's duties of distributive justice, which claims that the concern to insulate monetary policy from electoral manipulation does not require pursuing only the goal of eliminating inefficiency. The bank should, in addition, protect and promote the basic distributional values of the government. I argue that independent central banks should also protect individuals from unemployment, since monetary policy has such deep effects on employment, and they should to manage the risks generated by financia} regulations in ways that avoid jeopardizing the provision of a social mínimum, a precondition for any legitimate set of basic structural institutions. Finally, the international aspect of my dissertation explores four arguments to claim that the asymmetries between the least competitive countries and their competitors have been exacerbated by the Eurozone and cannot adequately be dealt with by relying only in intra-state solidarity.
Author: Josep Ferret Mas
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2574687687