Work

How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives?

Year: 2017

Type: article

Abstract: We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed salary and equity‐linked pay and exhibit higher pay‐performance (delta) and pay‐risk (vega) sensitivities. Our results also suggest that CEOs at firms with more overlap directors take smaller total pay and equity‐linked pay and reveal lower delta and vega. We further show that the impact of busy and overlap directors on CEO pay is more visible for firms with less complexity and low information acquisition cost.

Source: Accounting and Finance

DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12272

Authors: Shams Pathan, Peh Hwa Wong, Karen Benson

Institution: The University of Queensland

Language: English

Topic: Corporate Finance and Governance

Subfield: Accounting

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: green

Funder: Australian Research Council