Considering Character and Excuses as Blame Mitigation : A Comparative Analysis of Strawsonian and Aristotelian Accounts of Moral Responsibility
Year: 2017
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This dissertation is aimed at clarifying the concept of moral responsibility within Anglophone, analytic ethics broadly defined, as well as looking at the concept of character to inquire about its role embedded within these theories. In this work, it is claimed that considerations of character matter when moral responsibility is assessed. Two families of theories of moral responsibility are compared with each other starting with Peter F. Strawson s'sentimentalist theory, originated in his influential article Freedom and Resentment (Strawson, 1962) and followed by work of others including R. Jay Wallace (1994). Scholarship on Aristotle's theory provides the basis for a similar framework of responsibility for action (NE III.1). Other aspects of Aristotle's work provide additional depth to his concept of moral responsibility however. Character differs greatly in emphasis in Aristotle's theory from that of Strawson. It is claimed here that character is an essential part of human agency, and is thus a defining factor for actions taken. It is also claimed since that character is not a precise concept, taking it fully into account presents a formidable challenge to all theories attempting to explain responsibility exhaustively. In Strawson's case, the further claim is made that what is traditionally discussed in terms of character is rephrased in terms of pleas and special conditions, which amount together into excuses instead. One common concept that both of these doctrines utilize is blame. Blame (usually accompanied with praise) is identified as a crucial component of responsibility by a majority of thinkers writing on the subject, and this reasoning is followed here as well. An aporetic conclusion supporting critical sources is reached in terms of a common understanding of moral responsibility in Part I. The Aristotelian notion of character and the Strawsonian notion of excuse will be re-visited as examples of blame mitigation within the context of these theories in the systematic section of Part II. Analysis is conducted based on Bernard Williams's (1993 and 1997) explication of elements of responsibility, where a comparison is done between character and excuses appearing in the two families of theories of responsibility. Based on the findings it is concluded that the two theoretical families share similarity of structure regardless of the difference in their age, in a way that no matter whether character or excuses are used to describe the alteration of initial judgment, in terms of the end results blame mitigation appears to happen identically in all cases. Examination of character in the context of philosophy of responsibility shows that there is room for expansion in the narrower attempts to define the concept. Comparisons of both of these theoretical alternatives are illustrated with examples and further discussion is called for.
Author: Kaila, Eero 1981-
Institution: University of Helsinki
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: moral responsibility, character, excuses, blame, Aristotle, Freedom and Resentment, Bernard Williams, sentimentalism, human agency, praise and blame, analytic ethics, special conditions, pleas, responsibility for action, aporia, comparative ethics, virtue ethics, deontology, consequentialism
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2590072940
