Year: 2017
Type: dissertation
Abstract: In this thesis, I will argue that moral agents have both positive and negative duties to plants. \nThough sentience has been a benchmark for moral consideration, I argue that non-sentient life is \ncapable of well-being, and that we ought to promote their good. I employ a process in which one \nfirst considers whether a response to a particular object is rational, then which prescriptions of \nvalue are justified by that response. I establish a rational link between individual life and the \nresponses of awe, humility, and gratitude of which respect, preservation, protection, and affection \nare rational prescriptions of value. I argue that there is a presumptive negative duty not to harm, \nwhich only sometimes includes the duty not to kill. When it comes to wild plants, I argue that that \njustice demands that agents also observe positive duties of reparation or aid only when they cause \nunjustified harm to plants. Agents have many positive duties to domesticated plants grounded in \ntheir domestication. We have duties to provide for them, and end exploitative practices and \ninstitutions. I end by acknowledging that this argument is but one facet of moral concern, but that \nall agents must be attentive to whether or not their relationships are exploitative and unjust.
Author: Varia Ley Garon
Language: English
Subfield: Nature and Landscape Conservation
Field: Environmental Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2590634348