Work

Nash and Wardrop Equilibria in Aggregative Games With Coupling Constraints

Year: 2018

Type: article

Abstract: We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash and Wardrop equilibria. By exploiting a characterization of the two equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities, we bound their distance with a decreasing function of the population size. As second contribution, we propose two decentralized algorithms that converge to such equilibria and are capable of coping with constraints coupling the strategies of different agents. Finally, we study the applications of charging of electric vehicles and of route choice on a road network.

Source: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control

DOI: 10.1109/tac.2018.2849946

Authors: Dario Paccagnan, Basilio Gentile, Francesca Parise, Maryam Kamgarpour, John Lygeros

Institutions: ETH Zurich, Automatic Control Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: European Commission, Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung, FP7 Information and Communication Technologies

Awards: Dynamic Management of Physically Coupled Systems of Systems, G4655744611, Systemic Risk Analysis and Information Dynamics in Large-Populations Network Aggregative Games