No Need to Hide: Protecting Safe Regions on Commodity Hardware
Year: 2017
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: As modern 64-bit x86 processors no longer support the segmentation capabilities of their 32-bit predecessors, most research projects assume that strong in-process memory isolation is no longer an affordable option. Instead of strong, deterministic isolation, new defense systems therefore rely on the probabilistic pseudo-isolation provided by randomization to "hide" sensitive (or safe) regions. However, recent attacks have shown that such protection is insufficient; attackers can leak these safe regions in a variety of ways.
Authors: Koen Koning, Xi Chen, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida, Elias Athanasopoulos
Institutions: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, University of Cyprus
Language: English
Subfield: Hardware and Architecture
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
Awards: G312280494, G4937468798, G7880295628
OpenAlex ID: W2605597658
