Work

Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible

Year: 2017
Type: article
Abstract: The capacity for representing and reasoning over sets of possibilities, or modal cognition, supports diverse kinds of high-level judgments: causal reasoning, moral judgment, language comprehension, and more. Prior research on modal cognition asks how humans explicitly and deliberatively reason about what is possible but has not investigated whether or how people have a default, implicit representation of which events are possible. We present three studies that characterize the role of implicit representations of possibility in cognition. Collectively, these studies differentiate explicit reasoning about possibilities from default implicit representations, demonstrate that human adults often default to treating immoral and irrational events as impossible, and provide a case study of high-level cognitive judgments relying on default implicit representations of possibility rather than explicit deliberation.
Institution: Harvard University
Language: English
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2605772560
FWCI: 6.282
Cites: 41
Cited by: 175
Related to: 9