Work

Memory- n strategies of direct reciprocity

Year: 2017
Type: article
Abstract: Significance Direct reciprocity is one of the fundamental mechanisms for cooperation. It is based on the idea that individuals are more likely to cooperate if they can expect their beneficiaries to remember and to return their cooperative acts in future. Previous computational models, however, often had to restrict the number of past rounds subjects can memorize. Herein we suggest an alternative approach. We propose general properties that robust cooperative strategies ought to have. Then we characterize all memory- n strategies that meet these properties, and we show that such strategies naturally emerge across different evolutionary scenarios. Our results are applicable to general social dilemmas of arbitrary size. For some dilemmas, longer memory is all it takes for cooperation to evolve.
Language: English
Open Access status: bronze
Estimated APC paid: $1,692
OpenAlex ID: W2606734491
FWCI: 18.67
Cites: 52
Cited by: 175
Related to: 10