Year: 2017
Type: article
Abstract: The paper examines John Horton's realist political theory, in particular his critique of John Rawls's "high" or "liberal moralism", and seeks to determine the extent to which, together with Horton, we would have reasons to leave Rawls's and other Rawlsian accounts behind. The paper argues that some of the insights of Horton's realism are mistaken, whereas many of those which are not mistaken are compatible with liberal moralism correctly understood. The argument is also formulated in terms of contingency, in particular in terms of a contrast between the realist emphasis on the contingency of human existence and the liberal moralism's neglect or inability to properly account for it, due to a strong focus on necessity.
Source: Philosophia
Author: Susan Mendus
Institution: University of York
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
Funder: University of York
OpenAlex ID: W2613637752