Neural mechanisms of high-level cognitive processes in task preparation and implementation
Year: 2017
Type: dissertation
Abstract: To adjust our behavior based in goals is a core human ability that allows us to\nrapidly adapt to new demands or new environments. Cognitive control, that is, the\nmechanism that regulates our thought and actions upon internal representations of our\ngoals (Norman & Shallice, 1980), is thought to underlie this ability. Due to its central role\nin our cognitive activity, control is involved in a plethora of phenomena, and therefore it\ncan be analyzed from different perspectives. Specifically, this thesis takes advantage of\na temporal classification: reactive versus prospective control. While reactive control\nrefers to the immediate deployment of control upon conflict detection, prospective\nprocesses allow the anticipation and corresponding adjustment to forthcoming demands\n(Braver, 2012). The main aim of this thesis is to advance our knowledge about proactive\ncontrol.\nAll of our experiments highlight the predominance of top-down influences in\npreparatory mechanisms. However, bottom-up elements also play a role in controldemanding\ncontext. The biggest piece of evidence in this line comes from Experimental\nSeries 1, which revealed an unconscious bias in task set selection. This result is\ncoherent with previous studies showing unconscious influences in high-level processes\n(van Gaal et al., 2012). It therefore shows that at least some proactive control\nmechanisms can be altered by bottom-up information. Subsequently, in conjunction with\nprevious similar studies (e.g. De Pisapia et al., 2011), they suggest the dissociation\nbetween proactive control and consciousness (Hommel, 2017). Experiments I and II\nalso show how some stimuli, such as instructions, can elicit control processes\nautomatically (Liefooghe, Wenke, & De Houwer, 2012). The evolutive relevance of fast\nlearning (Cole et al., 2013) can underlie this automatic effect of instructions.\nDespite the relative automaticity described before, our data show an\noverwhelming predominance of top-down effects in proactive control. First, in\nExperimental Series I, the unconscious effect is only found when the executive setting is\nconfigured properly according to conscious expectations (Kiefer, 2012). Therefore,\nsubliminal perception can affect but not initiate control processes (van Gaal et al.,\n2012). Moreover, in Experiment I, conscious expectations regarding future demands\nwere shown to modulate brain activity during preparation. In the proactive control\nframework (Braver, 2012), the reported category specific activations can be understood\nas the outcome of a top-down influence, originating in control regions, on incoming\ninformation. Last, Experiment II reveals how actively preparing to implement novel task\nsets involves a large set of control areas. Moreover, category specific information could\nbe decoded from selective processing regions seconds before target onset, which\nshows again a bias in the processing of incoming information based on internal goals.\nAltogether, our results suggest that proactive cognitive control sets up our informationprocessing\nsystem in a top-down manner to allow some extent of automaticity\n(Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Kiefer, 2012; Kiefer & Martens, 2010). This, in turn, would\nmake our control systems more efficient by reducing costs associated to maintained\nmonitoring, and therefore, optimizing the consecution of our goals (Kiefer, 2012).\nIn sum, the present thesis reveals a dynamic relationship between bottom-up and\ntop-down processes. We interpret this relationship within the predictive coding\nframework (Friston, 2005), which suggests that our psychological experience is the\nresult of an iterative interaction between bottom-up information and top-down\npredictions that bias this information to guide perception. Such mechanism would allow\nthe evolutive development of a proactive control system (Buschman & Miller, 2014).
Author: Carlos González García
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2618048370
