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Cognitive and Neural Foundations of Concepts

Year: 2009
Type: article
Abstract: Cognitive and Neural Foundations of Concepts Markus Kiefer ([email protected]) Department of Psychiatry, Leimgrubenweg 12 Ulm, 89075 Germany Lawrence W. Barsalou ([email protected]) Department of Psychology, 532 Kilgo Circle Atlanta, GA 30322, USA Keywords: concepts; semantic memory; embodied cognition; perception; language. neurodegenerative conditions known collectively as Fronto- Temporal Dementia, called Semantic Dementia (SD), arises from relatively focal degeneration of the anterior temporal lobes bilaterally. The hallmark of SD is a degradation of conceptual knowledge that applies across all modalities of input and output and across all types of concepts and all types of conceptual features. The main principles governing the progressive deterioration of knowledge are the familiarity of an object or concept and its typicality within its domain: less familiar and less typical things are both more vulnerable. The combination of (a) the amodal, across-the-board semantic disruption characteristic of SD, (b) the sensitivity of the impairment to the typicality structure of conceptual knowledge and (c) the consistently focal and predictable lesion site leads to the following hypothesis: all of the specific sensory, motor and linguistic aspects of concept knowledge, which are in far-flung regions across the brain, communicate with a conceptual hub in anterior temporal cortex that represents semantic structure and that is essential to semantically-guided human behavior. Introduction Concepts in long-term memory are important building blocks of human cognition and form the basis for language, thought and action. Traditionally, concepts are specified as abstract mental entities different from perceptual or motor systems. From this perspective, sensory or motor features of objects and events are transformed into a common amodal representational format, in which original modality-specific information is lost (Fodor, 2001). Researchers often assume that a single abstract representation underlies conceptual processing, such as feature lists, semantic networks or statistical vectors. Challenging this classical view, recent modality-specific approaches propose that concepts are essentially grounded in perception and action (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008). Conceptual features (e.g., visual, acoustic, action-related) are represented by cortical cell assemblies in sensory and motor areas established during concept acquisition. Hence, access to concepts involves a partial reinstatement of brain activity during perception and action (Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger, Grothe, & Hoenig, 2008). The nature of conceptual representations is at the heart of a fierce debate in the cognitive sciences. In this symposium, we give an overview of the latest theoretical and empirical developments in research on the functional and neural architecture of conceptual memory. Speakers from a variety of disciplines including cognitive science, cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience critically discuss the sensory and motor foundations of concepts in mind and brain on the basis of different theoretical and methodological approaches. Perceptual or conceptual processing? Examination of category-specific impairments in brain- damaged patients as well as neuroimaging studies in healthy subjects demonstrating category-specific brain activation have been an important source of evidence in favor of a modality-specific representation of concepts. However, explanations of these findings remain controversial because the pattern of results has been rather inconsistent with regard to the precise anatomical locations associated with different types of knowledge. The contribution of Christian Gerlach (University of Arhus, Denmark) presents the results of a recent meta- analysis of functional imaging studies of picture processing (Gerlach, 2007), and highlights potential causes of the observed inconsistency. The meta-analysis suggests that many of the category-specific activations observed during visual object processing may reflect differences between categories in terms of structural similarity, with natural objects being more structurally similar than artifacts. Hence, at least in some cases, category-specific disorders may be caused by visual rather than conceptual impairments. Evidence in favor of this proposition also comes from neuroimaging studies of visual object processing in normal Is there an amodal conceptual structure? The existence of an amodal conceptual structure is one of the key questions in the present debate. Based upon neuropsychological studies in brain-damaged patients, the contribution of Karalyn Patterson (MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, U.K.) provides arguments for an amodal component of the distributed conceptual brain network that goes beyond the modality-specific sensory and motor aspects of conceptual knowledge (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). One variant of the set of
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2625913493
FWCI:
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