Perceptual Learning Meets Philosophy: Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and its Philosophical Implications
Year: 2001
Type: article
Abstract: Perceptual Learning Meets Philosophy: Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and its Philosophical Implications Athanassios Raftopoulos ([email protected]) Department of Educational Sciences University of Cyprus P.O. Box 20537 Nicosia 1678, Cyprus Abstract The undermining of the cognitive impenetrability of perception has led to the abolition of the distinction between seeing and seeing as, clearing the way for the relativistic theories of science and meaning, since perception becomes theory—laden. Hence the existence of a theory-neutral basis, on which a rational choice among alternative theories could be based, is rejected and scientific theories become incommensurable. One of the arguments against the cognitive impenetrability of perception is based on evidence from neuroscientific studies that suggest the plasticity of the visual cortex, in the sense that there can be some local rewiring of the neural circuitry of the early visual system, as a result of experience. This is taken to constitute evidence that the early vision is cognitively penetrable. In this paper I argue that the evidence concerning perceptual learning does not entail the cognitive penetrability of perception. To that end I discuss the issue of perceptual learning and claim that this learning is task and data-driven and not theory- driven. The process is mediated by the allocation of attention, which though cognitively penetrable, allows only an indirect form of cognitive penetrability of perception. In the last part I elaborate on the significance of this indirect penetrability, as opposed to the direct penetrability by cognition, and discuss its implications for the issue of the incommensurability of scientific theories. My conclusion is that attention can be controlled across different theoretical backgrounds, and thus, that the indirect cognitive penetrability does not entail incommensurability. Introduction The undermining of the cognitive impenetrability of perception has led to the abolition of the distinction between seeing and seeing as (Gregory, 1974; Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1962), clearing the way for the relativistic theories of science and meaning, since perception becomes theory—laden (what we see depends on our expectations, beliefs, and so forth). Hence the existence of a theory-neutral basis, on which a rational choice among alternative theories could be based, is rejected and scientific theories become incommensurable. There can be no communication between scientists that belong to different scientific paradigms, because there is not a theory-neutral perceptual basis that could resolve matters of meaning. Instead, empirical evidence, becomes part of a paradigm or a theoretical research program, being modulated by its theoretical commitments. Thus, proponents of different paradigms or research programs either perceive different worlds (strong version of relativism; Kuhn, 1962), or cannot compare their theories on the basis of some neutral empirical evidence but must search for other criteria of theory evaluation (medium version of relativism; Churchland, 1989). One of the arguments against the cognitive impenetrability of perception and in favor of its theory—ladenness is based on evidence from neuroscientific studies that suggest the plasticity of the visual cortex, and more specifically, on evidence that there can be some local rewiring of the neural circuitry of the early visual system, as a result of experience (the phenomenon of perceptual learning). The plasticity of the brain and the possibility of rewiring of the neural circuitry of the perceptual systems, as a result of acquiring knowledge, goes against the View (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1999) that some part of vision, the early vision, is cognitively impenetrable, and shows (Churchland, 1988) that perception is cognitively penetrable, in so far as learning, which is a cognitively driven process, affects even those circuits that are involved in early vision. In this paper I argue that the evidence concerning perceptual learning does not entail the cognitive penetrability of perception. To that end I discuss the issue of perceptual learning and claim that this learning is task and data-driven and not theory-driven.
Author: Athanassios Raftopoulos
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2626820794