Year: 2017
Type: article
Abstract: Clark has recently suggested that predictive processing advances a theory of neural function with the resources to put an ecumenical end to the "representation wars" of recent cognitive science. In this paper I defend and develop this suggestion. First, I broaden the representation wars to include three foundational challenges to representational cognitive science. Second, I articulate three features of predictive processing's account of internal representation that distinguish it from more orthodox representationalist frameworks. Specifically, I argue that it posits a resemblance-based representational architecture with organism-relative contents that functions in the service of pragmatic success, not veridical representation. Finally, I argue that internal representation so understood is either impervious to the three anti-representationalist challenges I outline or can actively embrace them.
Source: Minds and Machines
Author: Daniel Williams
Institution: University of Cambridge
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,290
Award: G8934280860
OpenAlex ID: W2682853549
